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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY BARS JOINDER OF EPA IN 
STATE COURT ACTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Aminoil U.S.A., Inc. v. California State Water Resources 
Control Board,l the Ninth Circuit held that the California state 
courts lack jurisdiction to join the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA)· as a party to an action seeking review of a state 
decision to issue a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES) permit. 
Aminoil, an oil and gas well operator located near Santa 
Ana, California, discharges drilling wastes into its surrounding 
environment.2 The basis of the dispute between Aminoil and the 
State Water Resources Control Board (State Board) was the 
proper characterization of this property. If characterized as a 
"wetlands'? pursuant to the Clean Water Act4 and its California 
counterpart, II Aminoil would have to obtain a NPDES permit 
from the State Board to legally discharge wastes.s 
In July of 1978, the Fish and Wildlife Service of the United 
States Department of the Interior requested that the Santa Ana 
Region of the State Board (Regional BoardF declare Aminoil's 
1. 674 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Wallace, J.; the other panel members were 
Anderson, J. and Jameson, D.J., sitting by designation). 
2. [d. at 1230. 
3. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1981) defines the term "wetlands" to mean "those areas that 
are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration suffi-
cient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vege-
tation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally includes 
swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas." 
4. The "Clean Water Act" refers to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 88 Stat. 816, amended by 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1369 (1978 & Supp. III 1979) and Clean Water Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
213, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977). 
5. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13000-13340 (West 1971). 
6. 674 F.2d at 1330. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1978). 
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site a 'wetlands" subject to the jurisdiction of the Clean Water 
Act. s The Regional Board decided that the area was not a "wet-
lands", and therefore Aminoil could discharge without a permit.9 
The EPA then sent Aminoil a "finding of violation"l0 of the 
Clean Water Act and notified Aminoil and the State Board that 
it would take appropriate action if the State Board had not com-
menced enforcement action within thirty days.ll Following this 
notice, the State Board reversed the Regional Board's decision, 
finding that Aminoil's property was a "wetlands" and that Ami-
noil must obtain a NPDES permit. 11 
In October of 1979, Aminoil petitioned the California State 
Superior Court for a writ of mandamus to review the State 
Board's findings. 18 Aminoil joinedH the Administrator of the 
EPA who promptly removed the action to the federal district 
courpa and then filed a motion to dismiss.18 The district court 
nine subsidiary regional boards, responsible for enforcement of the Clean Water Act in 
California, were approved by the EPA in 1973. See 39 Fed. Reg. 26,061 (1973). 
8. 674 F.2d at 1230. 
9. [d. Following this determination, Amigos de Bolsa Chica, an interested environ-
mental organization, petitioned the State Board for review of the Regional Board's deci-
sion pursuant to CAL. WATER CODE § 13320 (West Supp. 1982).674 F.2d at 1230. 
10. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(l) (1978) provides that "[wlhenever, on the basis of any 
information available to him, the Administrator finds that any person is in violation of 
any condition or limitation which implements section 1311 ... or 1342 of this title ... 
the Administrator shall issue an order requiring such person to comply with such condi-
tion or limitation or shall bring a civil action . . . ." 
11. 674 F.2d at 1230. 
12. [d. This decision was made on the same evidence as that before the Regional 
Board. 
13. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5 (West 1980) and CAL. WATER CODE § 13330 (West 
1978) provides for state court review of the State Board's finding on the "wetlands" 
issue. 
14. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 389 (West 1973), which permits joinder of an indispen-
sible party to an action, provides: 
A person who is subject to service of process and whose join-
der will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject 
matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if 
(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among 
those already parties or (2) he claims an interest relating to 
the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition 
of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter im-
pair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave 
any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk 
or incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obliga-
tions by reason of his claimed interest. 
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(I) (1976) states: "A civil action commenced in state court 
against an officer of the United States acting under color of office or on account of any 
2
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granted the motion, finding that the state court did not have 
jurisdiction over the EPA, and Aminoil appealed to the Ninth 
Circuit.17 
B. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
Prior to the passage of the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act of 1972, pollution control was the responsibility of the 
states. Under the 1965 Federal Water Pollution Control Act,.s 
states were allowed to decide the kinds and amounts of pollution 
to be permitted, the degree of pollution abatement required, and 
the time period within which pollution must end. However, Con-
gress found that the system was less than successful. Five years 
after its enactment, some states did not yet have federally ap-
proved standards. Time schedules were not being met because of 
insufficient enforcement, lack of effluent controls, and disputes 
over appropriate water quality standards. IS Congress passed the 
Clean Water Act in 1972 as a partial solution to these 
problems.lo Five years later, Congress passed the Clean Water 
Act of 1977, embodying the belief that to be effective, water pol-
lution control must be based on uniform, national standards 
which are adequately enforced.11 
The purpose of the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act is to eliminate pollutant discharges into 
"navigable waters"l1 of the United States by 1985.18 The vehicle 
by which this difficult task is to be accomplished is the NPDES 
right, title, or authority claimed under any Act of Congre88 may be removed to federal 
district court." 
16. The motion was made pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). 
17. 674 F.2d 1227, 1231. 
18. 33 U.S.C. § 1160 (1970) (amended 1972). 
19. S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 2d Se88. 8 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 3675. 
20. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1369 (1978). 
21. S. REP. No. 95-370, 95th Cong., 1st Se88. 73 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 4326, 4398. 
22. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 (1981). "Wetlands" are included in the definition of "navigable 
waters". The term "navigable waters" as defined in 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(b) (1981) means: 
"[those] waters of the United States that are subject to the ebb and .flow of the tide 
shoreward to the mean high water mark (mean higher high water mark on the Pacific 
coast) and/or are presently used, or have been used in the past, or may be susceptible to 
use to transport interstate or foreign commerce." See also 33 C.F.R. § 329 (1981) for 
additional information regarding "navigable waters". 
23. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1976). 
3
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permit program.2• Under the program it is unlawful to discharge 
a pollutant without a NPDES permit.211 The Clean Water Act 
provides for the EPA Administrator to issue such permits.26 
However, states may issue their own permits under state pro-
grams approved by the EPA 27 and the EPA must stop issuing 
permits once a state program has been approved.28 The EPA, 
however, retains authority to veto particular permits,29 or to 
withdraw approval of the entire state program if a state is not 
administering it in compliance with the Clean Water Act.sO 
24. In addition to providing for the creation of the NPDES permit system, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1342 (1978) provides for states to operate EPA approved programs and for the EPA to 
suspend its permit issuing program upon approval of a state program. This section also 
details the operation of the federal-state relationship in arriving at these permit 
decisions. 
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1978) states: "Except as in compliance with this section ... 
the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful." 
26. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1978) reads in part: "[T)he Administrator may, after oppor-
tunity for public hearing issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant, or combina-
tion of pollutants . . . ." 
27. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1978) allows a state to submit permit issuing plans for dis-
charges into navigable waters within its jurisdiction. "The Administrator shall approve 
each submitted program unless he determines that adequate authority does not exist to 
issue permits which apply, and insure compliance with ... [this title)." [d. 
It should be noted that while references to the EPA Administrator in the Clean 
Water Act are masculine, the EPA Administrator at the time Aminoil was heard, Ann 
McGill Gorsuch, is a woman. 
28. Not later than ninety days after the date on which a State has 
submitted a program (or revision thereof) pursuant to subsec-
tion (b) of this section, the Administrator shall suspend the 
issuance of permits under subsection (a) of this section as to 
those navigable waters subject to such program unless he de-
termines that the state permit program does not meet the re-
quirements of subsection (b) of this section or does not con-
form to the guidelines issued under section 1314(i)(2) of this 
title. If the Administrator so determines, he shall notify the 
State of any revisions or modifications necessary to conform to 
such regulations or guidelines. 
33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(1) (1978). 
29. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2) (1978) requires a state to send to the EPA a copy of each 
permit application it receives and to notify the EPA of every action related to the appli-
cation, including any proposed permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2)(B) (1978) provides that no 
permit shall issue "if the Administrator within ninety days of the date of transmittal of 
the proposed permit by the State objects in writing to the issuance of such permit as 
being outside the guidelines and requirements of this chapter." 
30. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) (1978) reads: 
Whenever the Administrator determines after public hearing 
that a State is not administering a program approved under 
this section in accordance with requirements of this section, he 
shall so notify the State and, if approved corrective action is 
not taken within a reasonable time, not to exceed ninety days, 
4
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Although the Clean Water Act provides for access to federal 
courts to review EPA decisions to deny NPDES permits,SI it is 
silent on the issue of federal review of state agency decisions. 
That question was decided by the Ninth Circuit in Shell Oil Co. 
v. Train. S2 Shell held that informal EPA recommendations to 
the state regional board regarding the issuance of a NPDES per-
mit are not reviewable in federal court. ss The court found that 
statutorily sanctioned informal recommendations by the EPA to 
the state regional board do not constitute federal action and 
therefore would not confer subject matter jurisdiction to the fed-
eral court.s. Shell also held that federal review was not com-
pelled by the Administrative Procedure Act (AP A) because EPA 
recommendations are not "final" actions. Sli The Ninth Circuit 
reasoned that a dissatisfied permit applicant should not be able 
to circumvent the appellate process envisioned by the Clean 
Water Act and bestow jurisdiction upon a federal court simply 
by alleging that the EPA coerced the decision of the state re-
gional board. S8 
the Administrator shall withdraw approval of such program. 
The Administrator shall not withdraw approval of any such 
program unless he shall first have notified the State, and made 
public, in writing, the reasons for such withdrawal. 
31. See Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 U.S. 193 (1980). In that case, the 
Director of the EPA's Region IX Enforcement Division objected to the permits proposed 
by a regional board. The Court stated: "When EPA. . . objects to effluent limitations 
contained in a state-issued permit, the effect of its action is to 'deny' a permit within the 
meaning of § 509(b)(I)(O." Id. at 196. Therefore, the Court held that federal courts have 
jurisdiction over the matter. 
32. 585 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1978). Shell applied for a state NPDES permit for its 
Martinez, California industrial complex, claiming that it should be classified as a class D 
refinery and as an organic chemical plant. In 1974, the California Regional Board classi-
fied the complex as a class E refinery, subjecting it to stricter effluent discharge limits. 
Shell filed an application for a variance, which the Regional Board forwarded to the 
EPA, pursuant to both the Memorandum of Understanding and federal law. The EPA 
recommended that the variance be denied, and the Regional Board ratified the EPA's 
recommendation. Shell sought review of the Regional Board decision in federal district 
court. Id. at 411. 
33. Id. at 414. In Shell, the EPA Administrator did not enter a formal objection to a 
proposed permit, but informally controlled the terms of the state permit by compelling 
the State Regional Board to reject a request for a variance. Id. 
34.Id. 
35. The Shell court noted that 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976) provides for federal re-
view of "final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court." 585 
F.2d at 414. 
36. 585 F.2d at 414. For criticisms of the Shell decision, see Note, Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 - Federal Court Review of EPA Recom-
mendations to State Pollution Control Agency, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 886 (1979); Note, 
Jurisdiction to Review Informal EPA Influence Upon State Decisionmaking Under the 
5
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The Clean Water Act specifically provides a means for the 
EP A to take independent enforcement action in the federal 
courts. 37 This provision, combined with the Shell decision, 
leaves permit applicants dissatisfied with a state decision in a 
difficult position. Applicants can seek review of a State Board 
decision only in state court;38 however, even if a favorable judg-
ment is received there, they may be faced with defending against 
an independent EPA enforcement action brought in federal 
court. In such situations, applicants have argued that the EPA 
should be collaterally estopped to relitigate in federal court is-
sues decided in a state court action. In United States v. ITT 
Rayonier,38 the Ninth Circuit held that the EPA was collaterally 
estopped·o from relitigating a permit issue previously deter-
Federal Water Pollution Control Act: Shell Oil v. Train, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1814 (1979). 
Judge Wallace dissented in Shell, believing the issue was whether a decision, an-
nounced by the California Regional Water Quality Board, but in fact made informally by 
the EPA, was reviewable in federal court. Judge Wallace premised his dissent on State of 
Washington v. Environmental Protection Agency (Scott Paper), 573 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 
1978), which held that an EPA veto of a proposed state permit was reviewable in federal 
court. The dissent concluded that there was no substantive difference between the EPA 
action in Scott Paper, where the Administrator formally vetoed the state permit after a 
state decision had been made, and Shell, where the EPA's decision was made without 
benefit of an initial state decision. Therefore, the federal court had jurisdiction to review 
the permit decision. 585 F.2d at 418. 
37. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1976) provides: 
The Administrator is authorized to commence a civil action 
for appropriate relief, including a permanent or temporary in-
junction, for any violation for which he is authorized to issue a 
compliance order under subsection (a) of this section. Any ac-
tion under this subsection may be brought in the district court 
of the United States for the district in which the defendant is 
located or resides or is doing business, and such court shall 
have jurisdiction to restrain such violation and to require com-
pliance. Notice of the commencement of such action shall be 
given immediately to the appropriate State. 
38. CAL. WATER CODE § 13330(a) (West 1980) states: "Within 30 days after service 
of a copy of a decision and order issued by the state board. . . any aggrieved party may 
file with the superior court a petition for a writ of mandate for review thereof .... " 
39. 627 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1980). The dispute centered on the meaning of a footnote 
to a state issued NPDES permit. ITT Rayonier received a favorable judgment from 
Washington State Superior Court and the EPA filed its own enforcement action in fed-
eral court under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1976) seeking injunctive relief and civil penalties. 
40. Collateral estoppel operates so that "[o)nce an issue is actually litigated and 
necessarily determined, that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a 
different cause of action but involving a party or one privy to the prior litigation". 627 
F.2d 996, 1000; See generally Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). 
In Rayonier, the court noted that "privy may include those whose interests are rep-
resented by one with authority to do so." 627 F.2d at 1003. See generally Ma Chuck 
Moon v. Dulles, 237 F.2d 241, 243 (9th Cir. 1956). In Rayonier, the Ninth Circuit deter-
6
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mined by a Washington State Court. However, in a subsequent 
case, Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Federal Energy Regula-
tory Comm.,41 the Ninth Circuit found that a federal agency was 
not bound by a Washington State Court's definition of "naviga-
ble waters" when it sought to relitigate the question in federal 
court. 
C. THE COURT'S REASONING 
The issue in Shell was whether a decision, influenced by the 
EPA but made by a California Regional Board, was reviewable 
in a federal court. The Ninth Circuit held that it was not, be-
cause the EPA had not yet taken final action and the issue could 
be adequately reviewed in a state court.42 Aminoil presented the 
corollary issue of whether a state court has jurisdiction to join 
the EPA as a party in an action to review a state agency's inde-
pendent determination.48 Although the action was removed to 
federal court, the Ninth Circuit focused on whether the state 
court had jurisdiction, because removal jurisdiction is entirely 
derivative of original state court jurisdiction.44 The Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that although California courts are courts of gen-
eral jurisdiction, the doctrine of sovereign immunity prohibits 
them from joining the EPA. 411 
Aminoil advanced several reasons why sovereign immunity 
should not prohibit it from joining the EPA in state court. First, 
Aminoil argued that the AP A waives sovereign immunity for 
mined that the Washington Department of Ecology and the EPA were privy because the 
interests of the Department an,d the EPA were identical and their involvement suffi-
ciently similar. 627 F.2d at 1000. 
41. 644 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1981). In 1913, the Washington State Supreme Court de-
cided that the White River was not "navigable". See Sumner Lumber & Shingle Co. v. 
Pacific Coast Power Co., 72 Wash. 631, 131 P. 220 (1913). The Ninth Circuit found that 
it was not bound by this determination because the test employed in Sumner differed 
from the standard of what constitutes "navigability under federal law." 644 F.2d at 788. 
42. 585 F.2d 408, 414. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text. 
43. 674 F.2d 1227, 1229. 
44. In Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 389 (1939), the Supreme Court 
held that removal jurisdiction is entirely derivative of original state court jurisdiction. If 
the state court did not have jurisdiction, the federal court will not have jurisdiction on 
removal, even if it would have had jurisdiction had the action commenced in federal 
court. 
45. 674 F.2d 1227, 1233. Sovereign immunity bars suit against an officer of the fed-
eral government unless the United States has waived its immunity by consent or the 
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non-monetary suits against the government.46 The court dis-
missed this contention because this waiver applies only to ac-
tions brought "in a court of the United States."47 Since Ami-
noil's action was commenced in state court, and since the AP A 
limits waiver to suits commenced in federal court, the Ninth 
Circuit found that the AP A could not be invoked as a basis for 
finding a waiver of sovereign immunity.48 
Aminoil next claimed that because the Administrator had 
incorrectly classified the property as a "wetlands", her actions 
exceeded her statutory authority and therefore were unprotected 
by sovereign immunity.49 Aminoil relied on Larson u. Foreign & 
Domestic Commerce Corp.oo for the proposition that where an 
officer's powers are limited by statute, actions beyond those lim-
itations are individual, not sovereign, actions. The Ninth Circuit 
found that Larson did not apply because the key question in 
that case was "whether relief sought in a suit nominally ad-
dressed to the officer is relief against the sovereign. "01 The court 
noted that the relief sought by Aminoil was clearly against the 
sovereign because the Clean Water Act authorized the Adminis-
trator to issue a "finding of violation." The court observed that a 
simple mistake of fact or law does not necessarily mean that an 
officer of the government has exceeded his or her scope of 
authority. all 
The court next analyzed the question of whether consent to 
46. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976) provides in part: 
An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other 
than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an 
officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official 
capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dis-
mi88ed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is 
against the United States or that the United States is an in-
dispensible party. 
47. 674 F.2d at 1233. See supra note 46. 
48. The court relied on the legislative history of the AP A, which states in part: "The 
consent to suit is also limited to claims in the courts of the United States; hence the 
United States remains immune from suit in state courts." H.R. REP. No. 1656, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 6121, 6131. 
49. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1) (1978). See supra note 10 for the text of this statute. 
50. 337 U.S. 682 (1949). 
51. 674 F.2d 1227, 1234, quoting Larson, 337 U.S. at 687. 
52. 674 F.2d at 1234. In Larson, the Court held that "if the actions of an officer do 
not conflict with the terms of his valid statutory authority, then they are the actions of 
the sovereign .... " 337 U.S. at 695. 
8
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suit could be based on the Clean Water Act's dual enforcement 
scheme. liS Aminoil relied on United States v. Hellardll4 to sup-
port its position that consent to suit is implied where a state 
court has jurisdiction to decide a matter in which a federal 
agency has an interest. However, the court distinguished Hel-
lard, noting that the statute in question there contained two sig-
nificant provisions: (1) the United States would be bound by 
state court judgments, and, (2) the United States must be given 
an opportunity to appear in state court actions.1I1I The court indi-
cated that had the Clean Water Act included similar provisions, 
Aminoil's argument might have succeeded.1I8 
The court refused to imply a congressional waiver of sover-
eign immunity, because the Clean Water Act's structure evi-
denced a congressional intent to preclude the exercise of state 
court jurisdiction over the EPA or the Administrator.1I7 The 
court stated that the Clean Water Act's "allocation of dual en-
forcement authority to state and federal agencies suggests a sim-
ilar allocation of judicial authority, confining review of formal 
EPA action to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. "118 
The Ninth Circuit found that its holding was compelled by 
an analysis of the jurisdiction issue, as well as by the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity. The Clean Water Act provides for federal 
jurisdiction over review of allegedly improper EPA action.1I9 The 
court emphasized that although no provision of the Clean Water 
Act states that the remedies specified are exclusive, in a scheme 
as detailed as that of the Clean Water Act, the remedies are pre-
sumed to be exclusive absent evidence of contrary legislative in-
tent.80 Examining the legislative history of the Clean Water Act, 
the court found no evidence that Congress intended to provide 
remedies not articulated in the Act itself; rather, Congress in-
53. 33 U.S.C. 1342(a), (b) (1978). See supra notes 26, 27. 
54. 322 U.S. 363 (1944). In Hellard, the Court found implied consent to suit in state 
court from an act of Congress which subjected United States land (Indian property) to 
state law. 
55. [d. at 364. 
56. 674 F.2d 1227, 1234. 
57. [d. at 1235. 
58. [d. 
59. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(l) (1978). 
60. 674 F.2d at 1235. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Aas'n of R.R. 
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974). 
9
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tended to preclude state jurisdiction over the EPA or Adminis-
trator.81 This finding was based on the EPA's statutory right to 
intervene in a "citizen suit" filed in a district court and the lack 
of any such right to intervene in a state court action.8D The court 
also acknowledged Aminoil's argument that it may remain sub-
ject to independent and potentially conflicting federal authority, 
but stated that allowing joinder of the EPA in state court would 
sharply conflict with the EPA's authority to supervise state per-
mit programs under the Clean Water Act.88 
Having concluded that the EPA cannot be joined in a state 
court action seeking review of the State Board's decision, the 
court next considered whether, if Aminoil successfully litigated 
the "wetlands" issue in state court, the doctrine of collateral es-
toppel would preclude the EPA from instituting an independent 
enforcement action in federal court.8. Previously, the Ninth Cir-
cuit had held, in United States v. ITT Rayonier, that the EPA 
was collaterally estopped from bringing an independent enforce-
ment action.811 However, the Aminoil court found that the in-
stant case did not fall within the scope of Rayonier. Rather, the 
court relied on Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Comm. 88 to assert that since there are situations 
in which the "wetlands" issue cannot be finally determined by a 
state court, the EPA would not be collaterally estopped to reliti-
gate this issue.87 
61. 674 F.2d at 1235. 
62. 33 U.S.C. 1365(c)(2) (1976). 
63. 674 F.2d at 1235. 
64. [d. at 1236. It is well established that "[i)f a state court and a federal court have 
concurrent jurisdiction over a cause of action, a judgment in either court will usually 
have complete res judicata effect in the other" and that different agencies of the United 
States government are in privity for collateral estoppel purposes. See Note, Res Judi-
cata: Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction and the Effect of Prior State Court Determian-
tiona, 53 VA. L. REV. 1360, 1363 n.16 (1967). See also Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. 
Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402-03 (1940). In addition, the United States can be prevented 
from pursuing an action which has been litigated by a party representing its interests. 
See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 153 (1979). The State Board can generally be 
presumed to represent the EPA's interests when litigating in the state court, since the 
EPA could cure any state board finding with which it disagrees prior to state court re-
view by vetoing the state permit and defending its veto in federal court. However, collat-
eral estoppel might not apply where state and federal courts employ different standards 
of review. See Note, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1814, supra note 36, at 1822 n.58. 
65. 627 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1980). See supra note 39. 
66. 644 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1981). 
67. 674 F.2d at 1237. 
10
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The court concluded that even if the EPA could be collater-
ally estopped in a subsequent enforcement action, it did not nec-
essarily follow that the EPA could be joined in a state court ac-
tion, since the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the Clean 
Water Act's allocation of jurisdiction precludes the states from 
exercising jurisdiction over the EPA. 66 The court emphasized 
that although its holding may not comport well with traditional 
notions of judicial economy, it is mandated by the scheme of 
cooperative federalism embodied in the Clean Water Act to 
"recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities 
and rights of the States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollu-
tion,"69 while insuring that water pollution control is uniform 
and adequately enforced.70 
D. SIGNIFICANCE 
Although the Ninth Circuit in reaching its conclusion relied 
primarily on its prior decision in Shell, the result in AmiilOil is 
not entirely consistent with Shell. One of the predicates of the 
Shell decision to preclude federal review of informal EPA action 
was that adequate relief was available in state court.7l However, 
state court review would be inadequate in Aminoil, because a 
favorable state court judgment would still be subject to attack 
by the EPA in an independent enforcement action brought in 
federal court. It is difficult to maintain that state court review is 
adequate if it does not provide a final resolution of the issue. 
Although the court in Aminoil did not address this apparent in-
consistency with Shell, it did note that to hold otherwise would 
sharply conflict with the EPA's independent authority to super-
vise state permit programs under the Clean Water Act.72 The 
necessity for preserving the authority of sanctioned EPA en-
forcement power was the underlying force which compelled the 
Ninth Circuit to find that the EPA may not be joined in a state 
court action seeking review of a state agency decision, and not 
be collaterally estopped by a prior state court judgment. 
Although the court's reasoning on the issue of sovereign im-
68.Id. 
69. 33 U.S.c. § 125I(b) (1978 & Supp. IV 1980). 
70. 674 F.2d at 1237. 
7t." 585 F.2d 408, 414. See supra note 35. 
72. 674 F.2d at 1235. 
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munity is adequately based, both on interpretation of statute 
and application of precedent, its refusal to find that the EPA 
would be collaterally estopped is questionable. Although the 
court relied on Puget Sound73 in holding that the EPA would 
not be collaterally estopped from relitigating the wetlands issue 
in an independent enforcement action, Puget Sound is distin-
guishable in that the definition which the federal agency sought 
to apply in that case differed from the definition applied in the 
earlier state court case. In the dispute in Aminoil, the definition 
used to determine if the property was a wetlands, and therefore 
a "navigable water" within the meaning of the Clean Water Act, 
was identical in state and federal court because. California had 
expressly adopted the federal definition.H However, the court 
also avoided finding that Rayonier would be binding precedent 
because the court in Rayonier stated that its decision "may be 
sui generis. ''71'> The Rayonier decision has yet to be subsequently 
applied to collaterally estop the EPA. 
The Ninth Circuit decision in Aminoil supports the inde-
pendent enforcement authority of the EPA by preserving its 
ability to avoid state court jurisdiction and possible usurpation 
of EPA power to review state agency decisions. Also, the EPA 
retains the ability to attack state court judgments on NPDES 
permit issues by filing a civil suit in federal court to enforce the 
Clean Water Act.78 There are sound policy reasons for maintain-
ing unfettered EPA enforcement authority on an individual per-
mit basis, without resorting to the more drastic step of revoking 
approval of an entire state program. To allow the EPA to be 
bound by a state court decision in such an action might effec-
tively destroy the EPA's independent enforcement power cre-
ated by the Clean Water Act.77 The legislative history of the 
Clean Water Act provides an insight into why this EPA power is 
80 important: 
EPA has been much too hesitant to take any ac-
tions where States have approved permit pro-
73. 644 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1981). See supra note 45. 
74. CAL. WATER CODE § 13373 (West Supp. 1982) states that the term" 'navigable 
waters' ... shall have the same meaning as in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
and acts amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto." 
75. 627 F.2d at 1004. 
76. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1978) 
77. [d. 
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grams. The result might well be the creation of 
"pollution havens" in some of those States which 
have approved permit programs. This result is ex-
actly what the 1972 amendments were designed to 
avoid. Lack of a strong EPA oversight of State 
programs is neither fair to industry nor to 'States 
that are vigorously pursuing the act's require-
ments. The committee is concerned that the 
Agency is not conducting a vigorous overview of 
State programs to assure uniformity and consis-
tency of permit requirements and of the enforce-
ment of violations of permit conditions.78 
247 
It is also important to consider that since water does not 
respect political boundaries, there is a national interest in uni-
form enforcement of the Clean Water Act. Uniform enforcement 
can be assured only if the EPA has final, supervisory authority 
over states in the operation of their permit programs. It would 
be unfair to those states which may discourage industry by 
strictly enforcing the Clean Water Act to be defeated in their 
pollution control efforts by having polluted water flowing in 
from other, less circumspect states. In addition, states with 
stricter enforcement programs would be at an economic disad-
vantage vis-a-vis states which make it possible for industry to 
pollute with impunity. 
Although the Ninth Circuit did not articulate a balancing 
process, it appears to have weighed the importance of congres-
sionally mandated uniform standards of water quality control 
against the need for judicial economy and expedient resolution 
of permit issues. The court indicated that its decision may not 
comport well with traditional notions of judicial economy be-
cause a permit applicant may have to litigate an issue twice, but 
indicated that this is a problem which the legislature must 
correct.79 
In practice, the Aminoil decision may not mean that an ap-
plicant will always be subject to multiple litigation. The court 
noted that an applicant might seek a declaratory judgment from 
federal district court, proceeding against the EPA and joining 
78. S. REP. No. 217, 97d Cong., 1st Se88. 73 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 4326, 4398. 
79. 674 F.2d 1227, 1337. 
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the State Board in the action.so Although the court did not pro-
vide guidelines as to when declaratory relief is appropriate, this 
avenue may alleviate the problem of multiple litigation. 
Donna D. Duer* 
SO. rd. at 1237 n.10. 
• Second year student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
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